Merge pull request SOMAS2020#60 from ezgimez/ostrom

[IIGO] [1/3] Analysis and evaluation

05_iigo/index.tex

@@ -151,22 +151,22 @@ \section{Legislative Branch}
     \begin{itemize}
 
         \item Call a vote $V$ for a rule $R$.
-        \begin{rule_IIGO}
-            The Speaker has the \emph{obligation} to \emph{call} a vote $V$ if and only if the President has \emph{selected} a rule $R$ to be voted on.
+        \begin{rule_IIGO}\label{rule:call_vote_obl}
+            The Speaker has an \emph{obligation} and a \emph{permission} to \emph{call} a vote $V$ if and only if the President has \emph{selected} a rule $R$ to be voted on.
         \end {rule_IIGO}
-        \begin{rule_IIGO}
+        \begin{rule_IIGO} \label{rule:call_vote_perm}
             The Speaker has the \emph{permission} to \emph{call} a vote $V$ for a rule $R$ if and only if the rule $R = R^{*}$, where $R^{*}$ is the rule \emph{selected} by the President.
         \end {rule_IIGO}
 
         \item Choose which islands are participating in the vote $V$.
        % \footnote{This is our sequential implementation alternative for the power to close the ballot box.}.
-        \begin{rule_IIGO}
+        \begin{rule_IIGO} \label{rule:all_islands_vote}
             The Speaker has the \emph{obligation} to ask for a vote from all alive islands.
         \end {rule_IIGO}
 
         \item Declare the result $C$ of a vote $V$.
         \begin{rule_IIGO}
-            The Speaker has the \emph{obligation} to \emph{declare the result} $C$ for a vote $V$ if and only if the vote V has been \emph{called}.
+            The Speaker has an \emph{obligation} and a \emph{permission} to \emph{declare the result} $C$ for a vote $V$ if and only if the vote V has been \emph{called}.
         \end {rule_IIGO}
         \begin{rule_IIGO}
             The Speaker has the \emph{permission} to \emph{declare the result} $C$ for a vote $V$ if $C = C^{*}$, where $C^{*}$ is the result produced by \emph{calling} the vote $V$.
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ \section{Judicial Branch}
         \end{rule_IIGO}
         \item Declare the outcome $\mathbb{O}$ of an inspection $I$ to all islands\footnote{This act of broadcasting is especially important for islands to form an opinion about the sanctioned islands accordingly.}.
         \begin{rule_IIGO}
-            The Judge has the \emph{obligation} to declare the outcome $\mathbb{O}$ of an inspection $I$ if and only if the inspection $I$ has been performed.
+            The Judge has an \emph{obligation} and a \emph{permission} to declare the outcome $\mathbb{O}$ of an inspection $I$ if and only if the inspection $I$ has been performed.
         \end{rule_IIGO}
         \begin{rule_IIGO}
             The Judge has the \emph{permission} to declare the outcome $\mathbb{O}$ of an inspection $I$ if $\mathbb{O} = \mathbb{O}^{*}$, where $\mathbb{O}^{*}$ is the outcome of the inspection $I$.
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ \section{Judicial Branch}
         %\end{itemize}
         \item Invoke economic \textbf{sanctions} (see Section~\ref{sec:sanctions} for more detail).
         \begin{rule_IIGO}
-            The Judge has the \emph{obligation} to invoke a sanction $S$ for an island $X$ if and only if an investigation $I$ has an outcome $\mathbb{O}^{*}$ indicating non-compliance, and $I$ is an investigation of an action taken by island $X$.
+            The Judge has an \emph{obligation} and a \emph{permission} to invoke a sanction $S$ for an island $X$ if and only if an investigation $I$ has an outcome $\mathbb{O}^{*}$ indicating non-compliance, and $I$ is an investigation of an action taken by island $X$.
         \end{rule_IIGO}
         \item Invoke even more severe sanctions in the case of further disobedience to previous sanction(s).
         \begin{rule_IIGO}
@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ \section{Accountability Cycle}
 
 Let role $X$ be accountable to the role $Y$, which is accountable to the role $Z$. Then:
 \begin{rule_IIGO} \label{rule:monitoring_1}
-    $Y$ has the \emph{obligation} to declare the outcome of the monitoring result $M$ associated with the action $A$ undertaken by $X$ if and only if $Y$ has monitored the action $A$ performed by $X$.
+    $Y$ has an \emph{obligation} and a {permission} to declare the outcome of the monitoring result $M$ associated with the action $A$ undertaken by $X$ if and only if $Y$ has monitored the action $A$ performed by $X$.
 \end{rule_IIGO}
 \begin{rule_IIGO} \label{rule:monitoring_2}
     $Y$ has the \emph{permission} to declare the monitoring result $M$ associated with the action $A$ undertaken by $X$ if and only if $M = M^{*}$, where $M^{*}$ is the outcome of \emph{monitoring} action $A$ performed by $X$\footnote{These constitutional rules should be available to the agents to check their decisions against. However, due to having only one degree of accountability cycle in place, these rules are not enforced through any sanctions (i.e. breaking these rules has no consequence as they are only deemed to be an \emph{agreement} between the roles).}.
@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ \subsection{Transfer-of-power}
 We introduce a \emph{term} length to increase the diversity of the decision group. If the Rule~\ref{rule:roles_must_hold_election} is in play, the roles are obliged to hold an election every $N$ turns. To reduce the scope of the coursework, the term length is defined as a configuration parameter. Thus, we reduce the complexity of rules surrounding the election of roles and hence the reasoning the agents have to do with regard to these rules.
 
 \begin{rule_IIGO} \label{rule:roles_must_hold_election}
-    The role $X$ has the \emph{obligation} to conduct a vote for the election of $Y$ if and only if $Y$ has been in power for more turns than the turn length or if role $Z$ has made a monitoring announcement that indicates wrongdoing by $Y$.
+    The role $X$ has an \emph{obligation} and a \emph{permission} to conduct a vote for the election of $Y$ if and only if $Y$ has been in power for more turns than the turn length or if role $Z$ has made a monitoring announcement that indicates wrongdoing by $Y$.
 \end{rule_IIGO}
 
 \begin{rule_IIGO} \label{rule:must_appoint_elected_island}
@@ -642,19 +642,19 @@ \subsubsection{Sanction Tier}
 Each sanction tier has an associated rule:
 \begin{itemize}
     \item Sanction tier 1: \begin{rule_IIGO} 
-        An island in sanction tier $1$ must pay a sanction of $0$\% of their current personal resources plus a constant amount of $10$.
+        An island in sanction tier $1$ has the \emph{obligation} to pay a sanction of $0$\% of their current personal resources plus a constant amount of $10$.
     \end{rule_IIGO}
     \item Sanction tier 2: \begin{rule_IIGO} 
-        An island in sanction tier $2$ must pay a sanction of $20$\% of their current personal resources plus a constant amount of $10$.
+        An island in sanction tier $2$ has the \emph{obligation} to pay a sanction of $20$\% of their current personal resources plus a constant amount of $10$.
     \end{rule_IIGO}
     \item Sanction tier 3: \begin{rule_IIGO} 
-        An island in sanction tier $3$ must pay a sanction of $30$\% of their current personal resources plus a constant amount of $10$.
+        An island in sanction tier $3$ has the \emph{obligation} to pay a sanction of $30$\% of their current personal resources plus a constant amount of $10$.
     \end{rule_IIGO}
     \item Sanction tier 4: \begin{rule_IIGO} 
-        An island in sanction tier $4$ must pay a sanction of $50$\% of their current personal resources plus a constant amount of $10$.
+        An island in sanction tier $4$ has the \emph{obligation} to pay a sanction of $50$\% of their current personal resources plus a constant amount of $10$.
     \end{rule_IIGO}
     \item Sanction tier 5: \begin{rule_IIGO} 
-        An island in sanction tier $5$ must pay a sanction of $80$\% of their current personal resources plus a constant amount of $10$.
+        An island in sanction tier $5$ has the \emph{obligation} to pay a sanction of $80$\% of their current personal resources plus a constant amount of $10$.
     \end{rule_IIGO}
 \end{itemize}
 
@@ -697,7 +697,7 @@ \subsubsection{Server-side}
 
 The monitoring cache is cleared after all roles have made a decision on whether to monitor and that decision has been carried out. If the IIGO session terminates early due to an error related to insufficient resources, the cache is not cleared. This allows wrongdoing by an IIGO role to be discovered at a later turn.
 
-\subsection{Rule Representation}
+\subsection{Rule Representation} \label{sec:rule_representation}
 
 \begin{quote}
     "Learn the rules like a pro, so you can break them like an artist."
@@ -948,7 +948,65 @@ \subsection{Rule Representation}
 \end{rule_IIGO}
 We then conditionally execute them such that if Rule~\ref{rule:cond1} fails then the whole structure passes, and if Rule~\ref{rule:cond1} passes, we expect Rule~\ref{rule:cond2} to pass as well for the rule to be adhered.
 
-\section{Future Work}
+\section{Analysis and Reflection}
+\subsection{Ostrom’s Design Principles and IIGO}
+\subsubsection{Institutional Analysis and Development framework overview of IIGO}
+
+In this section, we start the evaluation of IIGO by briefly stating or re-visiting the institution's \emph{Bio-Physical Characteristics}, \emph{Attributes of the Community}, \emph{Rules-in-Use}, as well as defining the distinct \emph{Action Arenas} and relevant \emph{Actors}:
+
+\begin{itemize}
+    \item \textbf{Bio-Physical Characteristics}
+
+    Resources are stored in two distinct \emph{facilities}: in private pools and in the common pool. The only \emph{facility} that can generate resources is foraging. Resources are expended through the cost of living, disaster events, cost of IIGO actions and potentially foraging. In the scope of this coursework, IIGO is only concerned with managing the movement of resources between private pools and the common pool. 
+
+    \item \textbf{Attributes of the Community}
+
+    All islands of the archipelago are part of the interest group of the community. They are both providers and appropriators. They all can participate in the decision making through voting in the legislative branch, elections and can all (not all at once) be a part of a more involved decision-making group, if they are elected to serve as either the Judge, the President or the Speaker. 
+
+    \item \textbf{Rules-in-Use}
+
+    In IIGO we have built a system for storing and checking rules (see Section~\ref*{sec:rule_representation}). There are operational choice rules (i.e., those introduced by systems of taxation, allocation and sanctions), collective choice rules (e.g., those stating the obligations and permissions of each role as well as the islands of the archipelago). The collective choice rules available to the agents can be seen listed after powers throughout the chapter. IIGO does not employ any constitutional choice rules, that are not "hard-coded" into the system. For example, all islands always vote in elections; in deciding an allocation, the President can be the only island involved in the final decision-making process. This, of course, was a limitation of the available scope of the project.
+
+    \item \textbf{Action Arenas}
+    \begin{enumerate}
+        \item The first decision arena of IIGO is that of rules surrounding appropriation and provision. The decision group consists solely of the President, however, all islands can provide information to the President by reporting the number of resources in their common pool as well as requesting a desired allocation. Here the island resource reports and allocation requests are information that the president can use to make a decision and set out the rules that we call tax and allocation. 
+
+        \item The second decision arena of IIGO is that surrounding collective choice rules. This is the process through which islands can change the rules in play and is the main concern of the legislative branch. All islands are involved in this process by proposing rules and voting but the Speaker and the President hold special decision-making powers (Section~\ref*{sec:legislative} and Section~\ref*{sec:executive}), which are expressed through the powers they hold.
+
+        \item The third decision arena of IIGO is that surrounding sanctions. Here the Judge is the only actor involved in the decision making of whether to and how harshly to sanction islands, as well as whether to pardon islands.
+
+        \item The fourth decision arena of IIGO is that surrounding monitoring of role powers and elections. The two are interlinked whereby the elected actors have to participate in not only the decision making surrounding elections but also the decision making in monitoring, which in turn can alter the rules in play to oblige other actors to hold elections. Moreover, elections involve the involvement of all islands voting, thus providing information to the island responsible for the appointment of a role. It is important to note the repetitive nature of decisions roles have to make regarding elections, followed by decisions regarding monitoring, followed by elections, and so on. 
+
+        \item The fifth decision arena involves the roles each of the IIGO roles decision regarding managing the costs of IIGO actions. For each action with a cost, the only actor involved is the agent holding the power. There is, however, a budget rule, that grants permission to act on these powers only if there is enough budget. The budget is incremented every turn and the amount of incrementation is to be set by the decision group described in the second decision arena.
+
+        \item The sixth decision arena involves the roles each of the IIGO roles decision regarding managing the salary of other IIGO roles. Similarly to the budget, the only actor involved in this decision is the role that holds the power to make the transaction - a flow of resources from the common pool to the respective (see Figure~\ref{fig:cycles_in_IIGO}) islands resource pool. This decision is affected by the salary rule (Rule~\ref{rule:salary}) which just like with budget is set by the decision group described in the second decision arena.
+
+        \item The seventh and final action arena IIGO involves the actual appropriation and provision of resources all agents perform each round. Here the decision is in the hands of each island, however, the rules surrounding the decision are formed by the decision group described in the first decision arena. 
+    \end{enumerate}
+
+\end{itemize}
+\subsubsection {Evaluation of IIGO with regard to Ostrom’s Design Principles} \label{sec:ostrom_eval}
+\begin{enumerate}
+    \item Clearly defined boundaries: those who have rights or entitlement to appropriate resources from the common pool are clearly defined, as are its boundaries.
+
+    To evaluate this principle we must look at action arenas 1 and 7. The seventh action arena tells us that every agent decides as to whether to appropriate resources. The first tells us that the President can enable clear boundaries by providing allocations.
+
+    \item Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and the state of the prevailing local environment.
+
+    To evaluate this principle we must look at action arena 1. We can quickly realise that ensuring congruence is a decision of the President. Hence there is an outcome of the system where an agent that is not concerned with the welfare of others or the long term common pool risk dilemma might set out taxes larger than the islands can even afford. To solve this problem we can introduce a Zone of Dignity. This would involve defining metrics and rules that state how the President's policies must measure up to the metrics. These metrics and rules, such as an islands resource amount below which a President is not permitted to tax an island, could be set by the legislative branch.
+
+    \item Collective-choice arrangements: in particular, self-determination, whereby those affected by the rules participate in the selection, modification and enforcement of those rules.
+
+    To evaluate this principle we must look at action arena 2 and 3. The selection of rules is related to the process of choosing a rule to vote on - islands decide and propose rules for the President to select one. We can notice that the institution is lacking. Which rule to select is a decision made by the President. Moreover, the President also proposes rules the same as every other agent. Hence, while all those affected participate by providing their desired rules to the President, that information may not be utilised. It is possible for opinion formation and the system of elections to, at least in part, remedy this. An agent would be less likely to vote for a President which selects rules that are distant from the agent's optimal rule-set. In an institutional state of oligarchy, this system would have no effect, so another solution might be needed. 
+
+    Rule modification is the result of the voting system. If all the available rules governing this process are followed by the agents, all agents equally contribute to this decision.  
+
+    Of note here is the Speaker's power to decide which islands are to participate in the vote. This power is governed by Rule~\ref*{rule:all_islands_vote} and is a remnant of a system of sanctions we considered during design, which could bar islands from participating in a vote. It is the Speakers power to call a vote, i.e. send a communication message to all the agents, hence it would have been the Speakers power to enforce such sanctions, by choosing which islands to send a vote request to. This system is not implemented, which begs for such a decision to be more regulated through a constitutional rule.
+
+    The enforcement of collective choice rules is covered by Ostrom's 4th principle.
+
+\end{enumerate}
+\subsection{Future Work}
 
 \textbf{Diplomatic sanctions.} Although having the potential of being a good alternative for severer sanctions discussed in  Section~\ref{sec:sanctions}, diplomatic sanctions are \emph{not} implemented within the scope of the coursework. \\
     Suggested diplomatic sanctions include: