security(deps): update 🛡️ requests to v2.32.2 [security]

[renovate]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Adoption	Passing	Confidence
requests (source, changelog)	==2.28.2 -> ==2.32.2

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2023-32681

Impact

Since Requests v2.3.0, Requests has been vulnerable to potentially leaking Proxy-Authorization headers to destination servers, specifically during redirects to an HTTPS origin. This is a product of how rebuild_proxies is used to recompute and reattach the Proxy-Authorization header to requests when redirected. Note this behavior has only been observed to affect proxied requests when credentials are supplied in the URL user information component (e.g. https://username:password@proxy:8080).

Current vulnerable behavior(s):

1. HTTP → HTTPS: leak
2. HTTPS → HTTP: no leak
3. HTTPS → HTTPS: leak
4. HTTP → HTTP: no leak

For HTTP connections sent through the proxy, the proxy will identify the header in the request itself and remove it prior to forwarding to the destination server. However when sent over HTTPS, the Proxy-Authorization header must be sent in the CONNECT request as the proxy has no visibility into further tunneled requests. This results in Requests forwarding the header to the destination server unintentionally, allowing a malicious actor to potentially exfiltrate those credentials.

The reason this currently works for HTTPS connections in Requests is the Proxy-Authorization header is also handled by urllib3 with our usage of the ProxyManager in adapters.py with proxy_manager_for. This will compute the required proxy headers in proxy_headers and pass them to the Proxy Manager, avoiding attaching them directly to the Request object. This will be our preferred option going forward for default usage.

Patches

Starting in Requests v2.31.0, Requests will no longer attach this header to redirects with an HTTPS destination. This should have no negative impacts on the default behavior of the library as the proxy credentials are already properly being handled by urllib3's ProxyManager.

For users with custom adapters, this may be potentially breaking if you were already working around this behavior. The previous functionality of rebuild_proxies doesn't make sense in any case, so we would encourage any users impacted to migrate any handling of Proxy-Authorization directly into their custom adapter.

Workarounds

For users who are not able to update Requests immediately, there is one potential workaround.

You may disable redirects by setting allow_redirects to False on all calls through Requests top-level APIs. Note that if you're currently relying on redirect behaviors, you will need to capture the 3xx response codes and ensure a new request is made to the redirect destination.

import requests
r = requests.get('http://github.com/', allow_redirects=False)

Credits

This vulnerability was discovered and disclosed by the following individuals.

Dennis Brinkrolf, Haxolot (https://haxolot.com/)
Tobias Funke, (tobiasfunke93@​gmail.com)

CVE-2024-35195

When making requests through a Requests Session, if the first request is made with verify=False to disable cert verification, all subsequent requests to the same origin will continue to ignore cert verification regardless of changes to the value of verify. This behavior will continue for the lifecycle of the connection in the connection pool.

Remediation

Any of these options can be used to remediate the current issue, we highly recommend upgrading as the preferred mitigation.

• Upgrade to requests>=2.32.0.
• For requests<2.32.0, avoid setting verify=False for the first request to a host while using a Requests Session.
• For requests<2.32.0, call close() on Session objects to clear existing connections if verify=False is used.

Related Links

• https://github.com/psf/requests/pull/6655

---

CVE-2023-32681 / GHSA-j8r2-6x86-q33q / PYSEC-2023-74

More information

Details

Requests is a HTTP library. Since Requests 2.3.0, Requests has been leaking Proxy-Authorization headers to destination servers when redirected to an HTTPS endpoint. This is a product of how we use rebuild_proxies to reattach the Proxy-Authorization header to requests. For HTTP connections sent through the tunnel, the proxy will identify the header in the request itself and remove it prior to forwarding to the destination server. However when sent over HTTPS, the Proxy-Authorization header must be sent in the CONNECT request as the proxy has no visibility into the tunneled request. This results in Requests forwarding proxy credentials to the destination server unintentionally, allowing a malicious actor to potentially exfiltrate sensitive information. This issue has been patched in version 2.31.0.

Severity

Unknown

References

• https://github.com/psf/requests/security/advisories/GHSA-j8r2-6x86-q33q
• https://github.com/psf/requests/releases/tag/v2.31.0
• https://github.com/psf/requests/commit/74ea7cf7a6a27a4eeb2ae24e162bcc942a6706d5
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/[email protected]/message/AW7HNFGYP44RT3DUDQXG2QT3OEV2PJ7Y/

This data is provided by OSV and the PyPI Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Unintended leak of Proxy-Authorization header in requests

CVE-2023-32681 / GHSA-j8r2-6x86-q33q / PYSEC-2023-74

More information

Details

Impact

Since Requests v2.3.0, Requests has been vulnerable to potentially leaking Proxy-Authorization headers to destination servers, specifically during redirects to an HTTPS origin. This is a product of how rebuild_proxies is used to recompute and reattach the Proxy-Authorization header to requests when redirected. Note this behavior has only been observed to affect proxied requests when credentials are supplied in the URL user information component (e.g. https://username:password@proxy:8080).

Current vulnerable behavior(s):

1. HTTP → HTTPS: leak
2. HTTPS → HTTP: no leak
3. HTTPS → HTTPS: leak
4. HTTP → HTTP: no leak

For HTTP connections sent through the proxy, the proxy will identify the header in the request itself and remove it prior to forwarding to the destination server. However when sent over HTTPS, the Proxy-Authorization header must be sent in the CONNECT request as the proxy has no visibility into further tunneled requests. This results in Requests forwarding the header to the destination server unintentionally, allowing a malicious actor to potentially exfiltrate those credentials.

The reason this currently works for HTTPS connections in Requests is the Proxy-Authorization header is also handled by urllib3 with our usage of the ProxyManager in adapters.py with proxy_manager_for. This will compute the required proxy headers in proxy_headers and pass them to the Proxy Manager, avoiding attaching them directly to the Request object. This will be our preferred option going forward for default usage.

Patches

Starting in Requests v2.31.0, Requests will no longer attach this header to redirects with an HTTPS destination. This should have no negative impacts on the default behavior of the library as the proxy credentials are already properly being handled by urllib3's ProxyManager.

For users with custom adapters, this may be potentially breaking if you were already working around this behavior. The previous functionality of rebuild_proxies doesn't make sense in any case, so we would encourage any users impacted to migrate any handling of Proxy-Authorization directly into their custom adapter.

Workarounds

For users who are not able to update Requests immediately, there is one potential workaround.

You may disable redirects by setting allow_redirects to False on all calls through Requests top-level APIs. Note that if you're currently relying on redirect behaviors, you will need to capture the 3xx response codes and ensure a new request is made to the redirect destination.

import requests
r = requests.get('http://github.com/', allow_redirects=False)

Credits

This vulnerability was discovered and disclosed by the following individuals.

Dennis Brinkrolf, Haxolot (https://haxolot.com/)
Tobias Funke, (tobiasfunke93@​gmail.com)

Severity

• CVSS Score: 6.1 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

References

• https://github.com/psf/requests/security/advisories/GHSA-j8r2-6x86-q33q
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-32681
• https://github.com/psf/requests/commit/74ea7cf7a6a27a4eeb2ae24e162bcc942a6706d5
• https://github.com/psf/requests
• https://github.com/psf/requests/releases/tag/v2.31.0
• https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/requests/PYSEC-2023-74.yaml
• https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2023/06/msg00018.html
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/[email protected]/message/AW7HNFGYP44RT3DUDQXG2QT3OEV2PJ7Y
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/[email protected]/message/KOYASTZDGQG2BWLSNBPL3TQRL2G7QYNZ
• https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202309-08

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Requests Session object does not verify requests after making first request with verify=False

CVE-2024-35195 / GHSA-9wx4-h78v-vm56

More information

Details

When making requests through a Requests Session, if the first request is made with verify=False to disable cert verification, all subsequent requests to the same origin will continue to ignore cert verification regardless of changes to the value of verify. This behavior will continue for the lifecycle of the connection in the connection pool.

Remediation

Any of these options can be used to remediate the current issue, we highly recommend upgrading as the preferred mitigation.

• Upgrade to requests>=2.32.0.
• For requests<2.32.0, avoid setting verify=False for the first request to a host while using a Requests Session.
• For requests<2.32.0, call close() on Session objects to clear existing connections if verify=False is used.

Related Links

• https://github.com/psf/requests/pull/6655

Severity

• CVSS Score: 5.6 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

References

• https://github.com/psf/requests/security/advisories/GHSA-9wx4-h78v-vm56
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-35195
• https://github.com/psf/requests/pull/6655
• https://github.com/psf/requests/commit/a58d7f2ffb4d00b46dca2d70a3932a0b37e22fac
• https://github.com/psf/requests
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/[email protected]/message/IYLSNK5TL46Q6XPRVMHVWS63MVJQOK4Q
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/[email protected]/message/N7WP6EYDSUOCOJYHDK5NX43PYZ4SNHGZ

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Release Notes

psf/requests (requests)

v2.32.2

Compare Source

Deprecations

• To provide a more stable migration for custom HTTPAdapters impacted
  by the CVE changes in 2.32.0, we've renamed _get_connection to
  a new public API, get_connection_with_tls_context. Existing custom
  HTTPAdapters will need to migrate their code to use this new API.
  get_connection is considered deprecated in all versions of Requests>=2.32.0.

  A minimal (2-line) example has been provided in the linked PR to ease
  migration, but we strongly urge users to evaluate if their custom adapter
  is subject to the same issue described in CVE-2024-35195. (#​6710)

v2.32.1

Compare Source

Bugfixes

• Add missing test certs to the sdist distributed on PyPI.

v2.32.0

Compare Source

Security

• Fixed an issue where setting verify=False on the first request from a
  Session will cause subsequent requests to the same origin to also ignore
  cert verification, regardless of the value of verify.
  (GHSA-9wx4-h78v-vm56)

Improvements

• verify=True now reuses a global SSLContext which should improve
  request time variance between first and subsequent requests. It should
  also minimize certificate load time on Windows systems when using a Python
  version built with OpenSSL 3.x. (#​6667)
• Requests now supports optional use of character detection
  (chardet or charset_normalizer) when repackaged or vendored.
  This enables pip and other projects to minimize their vendoring
  surface area. The Response.text() and apparent_encoding APIs
  will default to utf-8 if neither library is present. (#​6702)

Bugfixes

• Fixed bug in length detection where emoji length was incorrectly
  calculated in the request content-length. (#​6589)
• Fixed deserialization bug in JSONDecodeError. (#​6629)
• Fixed bug where an extra leading / (path separator) could lead
  urllib3 to unnecessarily reparse the request URI. (#​6644)

Deprecations

• Requests has officially added support for CPython 3.12 (#​6503)
• Requests has officially added support for PyPy 3.9 and 3.10 (#​6641)
• Requests has officially dropped support for CPython 3.7 (#​6642)
• Requests has officially dropped support for PyPy 3.7 and 3.8 (#​6641)

Documentation

• Various typo fixes and doc improvements.

Packaging

• Requests has started adopting some modern packaging practices.
  The source files for the projects (formerly requests) is now located
  in src/requests in the Requests sdist. (#​6506)
• Starting in Requests 2.33.0, Requests will migrate to a PEP 517 build system
  using hatchling. This should not impact the average user, but extremely old
  versions of packaging utilities may have issues with the new packaging format.

v2.31.0

Compare Source

Security

• Versions of Requests between v2.3.0 and v2.30.0 are vulnerable to potential
  forwarding of Proxy-Authorization headers to destination servers when
  following HTTPS redirects.

  When proxies are defined with user info (https://user:pass@proxy:8080), Requests
  will construct a Proxy-Authorization header that is attached to the request to
  authenticate with the proxy.

  In cases where Requests receives a redirect response, it previously reattached
  the Proxy-Authorization header incorrectly, resulting in the value being
  sent through the tunneled connection to the destination server. Users who rely on
  defining their proxy credentials in the URL are strongly encouraged to upgrade
  to Requests 2.31.0+ to prevent unintentional leakage and rotate their proxy
  credentials once the change has been fully deployed.

  Users who do not use a proxy or do not supply their proxy credentials through
  the user information portion of their proxy URL are not subject to this
  vulnerability.

  Full details can be read in our Github Security Advisory
  and CVE-2023-32681.

v2.30.0

Compare Source

Dependencies

• ⚠️ Added support for urllib3 2.0. ⚠️

  This may contain minor breaking changes so we advise careful testing and
  reviewing https://urllib3.readthedocs.io/en/latest/v2-migration-guide.html
  prior to upgrading.

  Users who wish to stay on urllib3 1.x can pin to urllib3<2.

v2.29.0

Compare Source

Improvements

• Requests now defers chunked requests to the urllib3 implementation to improve
  standardization. (#​6226)
• Requests relaxes header component requirements to support bytes/str subclasses. (#​6356)

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[sheldonhull]

probably conflict with environment variables for publishing vs testing conflicting and thus scope is wrong