You signed in with another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You signed out in another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You switched accounts on another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.Dismiss alert
Path to dependency file: /EpiSample/modules/_protected/Shell/Shell/11.1.0.0/ClientResources/lib/xstyle/package.json
Path to vulnerable library: /EpiSample/modules/_protected/Shell/Shell/11.1.0.0/ClientResources/lib/xstyle/node_modules/tar/package.json
Dependency Hierarchy:
intern-geezer-2.2.3.tgz (Root Library)
digdug-1.4.0.tgz
decompress-0.2.3.tgz
❌ tar-0.1.20.tgz (Vulnerable Library)
Found in base branch: master
Vulnerability Details
The npm package "tar" (aka node-tar) before versions 4.4.16, 5.0.8, and 6.1.7 has an arbitrary file creation/overwrite and arbitrary code execution vulnerability. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file whose location would be modified by a symbolic link is not extracted. This is, in part, achieved by ensuring that extracted directories are not symlinks. Additionally, in order to prevent unnecessary stat calls to determine whether a given path is a directory, paths are cached when directories are created. This logic was insufficient when extracting tar files that contained both a directory and a symlink with the same name as the directory, where the symlink and directory names in the archive entry used backslashes as a path separator on posix systems. The cache checking logic used both \ and / characters as path separators, however \ is a valid filename character on posix systems. By first creating a directory, and then replacing that directory with a symlink, it was thus possible to bypass node-tar symlink checks on directories, essentially allowing an untrusted tar file to symlink into an arbitrary location and subsequently extracting arbitrary files into that location, thus allowing arbitrary file creation and overwrite. Additionally, a similar confusion could arise on case-insensitive filesystems. If a tar archive contained a directory at FOO, followed by a symbolic link named foo, then on case-insensitive file systems, the creation of the symbolic link would remove the directory from the filesystem, but not from the internal directory cache, as it would not be treated as a cache hit. A subsequent file entry within the FOO directory would then be placed in the target of the symbolic link, thinking that the directory had already been created. These issues were addressed in releases 4.4.16, 5.0.8 and 6.1.7. The v3 branch of node-tar has been deprecated and did not receive patches for these issues. If you are still using a v3 release we recommend you update to a more recent version of node-tar. If this is not possible, a workaround is available in the referenced GHSA-9r2w-394v-53qc.
CVE-2021-37701 - High Severity Vulnerability
Vulnerable Library - tar-0.1.20.tgz
tar for node
Library home page: https://registry.npmjs.org/tar/-/tar-0.1.20.tgz
Path to dependency file: /EpiSample/modules/_protected/Shell/Shell/11.1.0.0/ClientResources/lib/xstyle/package.json
Path to vulnerable library: /EpiSample/modules/_protected/Shell/Shell/11.1.0.0/ClientResources/lib/xstyle/node_modules/tar/package.json
Dependency Hierarchy:
Found in base branch: master
Vulnerability Details
The npm package "tar" (aka node-tar) before versions 4.4.16, 5.0.8, and 6.1.7 has an arbitrary file creation/overwrite and arbitrary code execution vulnerability. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file whose location would be modified by a symbolic link is not extracted. This is, in part, achieved by ensuring that extracted directories are not symlinks. Additionally, in order to prevent unnecessary stat calls to determine whether a given path is a directory, paths are cached when directories are created. This logic was insufficient when extracting tar files that contained both a directory and a symlink with the same name as the directory, where the symlink and directory names in the archive entry used backslashes as a path separator on posix systems. The cache checking logic used both
\
and/
characters as path separators, however\
is a valid filename character on posix systems. By first creating a directory, and then replacing that directory with a symlink, it was thus possible to bypass node-tar symlink checks on directories, essentially allowing an untrusted tar file to symlink into an arbitrary location and subsequently extracting arbitrary files into that location, thus allowing arbitrary file creation and overwrite. Additionally, a similar confusion could arise on case-insensitive filesystems. If a tar archive contained a directory atFOO
, followed by a symbolic link namedfoo
, then on case-insensitive file systems, the creation of the symbolic link would remove the directory from the filesystem, but not from the internal directory cache, as it would not be treated as a cache hit. A subsequent file entry within theFOO
directory would then be placed in the target of the symbolic link, thinking that the directory had already been created. These issues were addressed in releases 4.4.16, 5.0.8 and 6.1.7. The v3 branch of node-tar has been deprecated and did not receive patches for these issues. If you are still using a v3 release we recommend you update to a more recent version of node-tar. If this is not possible, a workaround is available in the referenced GHSA-9r2w-394v-53qc.Publish Date: 2021-08-31
URL: CVE-2021-37701
CVSS 3 Score Details (8.6)
Base Score Metrics:
Suggested Fix
Type: Upgrade version
Origin: GHSA-9r2w-394v-53qc
Release Date: 2021-08-31
Fix Resolution: tar - 4.4.16,5.0.8,6.1.7
Step up your Open Source Security Game with Mend here
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: