From 06657d3043a0884106d1ba31e25575738328c26f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: John Jones Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2019 08:37:03 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 1/5] Initial commit of BSIP0083 --- bsip-0083.md | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 74 insertions(+) create mode 100644 bsip-0083.md diff --git a/bsip-0083.md b/bsip-0083.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..53ca145 --- /dev/null +++ b/bsip-0083.md @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +``` +BSIP: 0083 +Title: Decouple BitAssets from Platform Governance Process +Authors: + Alfredo Garcia + Christopher Sanborn + John M. Jones + Michel Santos + Nathan Hourt + Peter Conrad + Ryan R. Fox +Status: Draft +Type: Protocol +Obsoletes: BSIP-0016, BSIP-0058, BSIP-0059, BSIP-0075, BSIP-0076 +Created: 2019-10-07 +Discussion: https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/239 +Worker: +``` + +# Abstract +This BSIP separates the governance of the technical security of the blockchain from the governance of BitAssets. BitAssets are a collection of special case SmartCoin which conflate blockchain governance and market effectiveness. To best serve the BitShares protocol, the existing set of BitAssets must be reconfigured to separate the concerns of block production, price feeds, and market operations; that is to say: deterministic consensus, non-deterministic external data, and smart contract settings. + +Therefore, this BSIP defines a process for BitAssets management to ensure protocol security remains the singular focus of the block producer role, and give BitAssets the best chance for long-term viability by nominating a new custodian to quickly react to market conditions. Furthermore, the portion of BTS collateral below the full valuation of a debt asset, as defined by its price feed, that is borrowed from the blockchain, shall not contribute to the voting power of the debtor. + +# Motivation +Block production is an essential component of the BitShares platform itself, and as such should be expected to take an agnostic and neutral view towards the products deployed within the platform. Therefore, this BSIP will define a process for BitAsset management to ensure protocol security remains the singular focus of the block producer role and give BitAssets the best chance for long-term stability by nominating a new custodian to quickly react to market conditions. In order for the distributed consensus mechanism of DPOS to achieve adequate decentralization, it is imperative that block producers maintain strict independence from the politics of individual products deployed on the platform. + +Governance is an important component of the core BTS token and effective application of governance throughout the BitShares protocol is imperative to the long-term success of the project. A number of BSIPs have addressed the shortcomings of the existing vote calculation mechanism. This BSIP changes vote calculation which currently confers governance rights which are intended for assignment to the protocol. + +In short, this BSIP will put the BitAssets under the control of a designated user account. With this change, the newly appointed BitAssets manager will be able to independently maintain the parameters of their derivative asset without interference from the platform’s block producers and committee members. At the same time, the platform itself and its committee will not be unduly influenced by the demands of private product management. An advantage gained by this is that the BitAsset manager will be able to react appropriately to rapidly changing market conditions, as may be required to properly maintain a successful derivative asset. + +# Rationale +Because the BitAssets are currently controlled by platform-wide governance mechanisms, and because these are not well suited to the management of smart coins, which may at times need to respond quickly to market conditions, the authors propose to reorganize these assets to utilize a directly appointed multisignature authority and thereby enable these assets to update in synchronization with market ebbs and flows. + +The authors recommend reassigning the blockchain-controlled BitAssets’ issuer field from committee-account to cn-vote, which is a multisignature account composed of seven different parties and having numerous proxy followers, and setting cn-vote as the sole feed producer, until cn-vote can delegate this role to accounts of its own appointment. The authors selected cn-vote for this role because cn-vote has demonstrated an active and vested interest in the stability and viability of the BitAsset products. Should cn-vote accept this appointment, the specification of the BitAsset parameters and feed production will become the responsibility of the cn-vote multisignature account. + +As a result of this assignment, the block producers will no longer provide feeds for BitAssets, and the new set of feed producers will no longer be affected by direct stakeholder voting. + +Because BitAsset management will no longer be affected by stakeholder voting, the vote-weighting calculations can be amended without detriment so that accounts holding BTS collateral positions will count only collateral above the value of their debt at the feed price. Collateral up to a 1.0 collateral-to-debt ratio is under lien to the BitAsset holder, and therefore does not represent a stake in the blockchain, and will no longer be counted as voting stake. Collateral in excess of a 1.0 collateral-to-debt ratio will continue to be counted in the debt holder’s voting stake. + +# Specification +The blockchain software is designed to support assets with multisignature issuer authorities; therefore, the technical changes required for this proposal are straightforward. The following technical changes are required: + +**Assignment of Accumulated Fees** + +At the hardfork date, the accumulated fees of the existing BitAssets will be transferred to the committee-account. + +**Update to Committee-Controlled BitAsset Issuer Fields** + +At the hardfork date, the committee-controlled BitAsset objects' issuer fields will be updated to specify the cn-vote account (ID 1.2.1148184). The existing price feeds will be cleared, and the cn-vote account will be specified as the feed producer. After the hardfork, the cn-vote account will be able to assign other feed producers at its discretion. + +**Disable the witness_fed_asset and committee_fed_asset Flags** + +At the hardfork date, the `witness_fed_asset` and `committee_fed_asset` flags will be unset from the BitAssets, and will be disabled from use in future assets. + +**Amend total_core_in_orders to Track Limit and Collateral Orders Separately** + +The `total_core_in_orders` field of the `account_statistics_object` will be deprecated, and assets in limit orders will be tallied in a new `total_core_in_limit_orders` field while collateral will be tracked in a new `total_core_in_collateral_orders` map, keyed on the collateralized asset ID. During vote weight calculation, the `total_core_in_limit_orders` will add directly to the account’s voting weight; additionally, the `total_core_in_collateral_orders` which exceeds the feed price value of the collateralized debt will be added to the account’s voting weight as well. + +**Enable Remittance of Worker Proposals in Core Asset** + +Escrow agents administering existing worker proposals presently denominated in BitAssets shall be authorized to remit worker payments in BitShares core asset, or in a BitAsset selected at the discretion of the workers and escrow agents. + +# Discussion +### Voting Power +The voting power of debt holders will be reduced to only the portion of collateral that exceeds full collateral valuation of the debt assets that are borrowed from the blockchain. It is arguable who “owns” BTS that are locked up as collateral in BitAsset smart contracts. The authors of this BSIP hold the view that debt holders have received BitAssets in return for their collateral (which they may have sold on the market for more BTS), and thus have given up rights to the collateral itself, at least to the portion of collateral that represents the value of the BitAssets they have received. It is only logical that by exchanging the collateral for BitAssets they have given up the rights associated with the collateral, including its voting power. +### Worker Proposals +Worker proposals were originally denominated in BitAssets with the intent to add liquidity in their respective markets. With BitAssets now being placed under user control, liquidity is no longer the concern of the platform. A further implication of placing BitAssets under custodian control is that workers being paid in BitAssets would be exposed to the risk of devaluation and/or de-pegging at the custodian's discretion. This BSIP aims to remedy this by allowing different payout methods deemed less risky. + +# Summary +In this BSIP the authors provide a unified solution to advance the project forward most efficiently. This proposal will decouple BitAssets from the rest of the BitShares platform with regard to governance. Instead, BitAssets can be controlled independently by a new BitAsset manager. The platform will be governed by the elected witnesses and committee, as before. This BSIP does not impact non-BitAsset Smart Coins. + +# Copyright +This document is placed into the public domain. From 9b208db788c47530c165c12118ab64601dd7ec05 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Conrad Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2019 07:31:32 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 2/5] Removed voting change, replaced cn-vote with elected authority --- bsip-0083.md | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/bsip-0083.md b/bsip-0083.md index 53ca145..51fb6c5 100644 --- a/bsip-0083.md +++ b/bsip-0083.md @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ Authors: Ryan R. Fox Status: Draft Type: Protocol -Obsoletes: BSIP-0016, BSIP-0058, BSIP-0059, BSIP-0075, BSIP-0076 +Obsoletes: BSIP-0016, BSIP-0058, BSIP-0059, BSIP-0076 Created: 2019-10-07 Discussion: https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/239 Worker: @@ -20,55 +20,61 @@ Worker: # Abstract This BSIP separates the governance of the technical security of the blockchain from the governance of BitAssets. BitAssets are a collection of special case SmartCoin which conflate blockchain governance and market effectiveness. To best serve the BitShares protocol, the existing set of BitAssets must be reconfigured to separate the concerns of block production, price feeds, and market operations; that is to say: deterministic consensus, non-deterministic external data, and smart contract settings. -Therefore, this BSIP defines a process for BitAssets management to ensure protocol security remains the singular focus of the block producer role, and give BitAssets the best chance for long-term viability by nominating a new custodian to quickly react to market conditions. Furthermore, the portion of BTS collateral below the full valuation of a debt asset, as defined by its price feed, that is borrowed from the blockchain, shall not contribute to the voting power of the debtor. +Therefore, this BSIP defines a process for BitAssets management to ensure protocol security remains the singular focus of the block producer role, and give BitAssets the best chance for long-term viability by nominating a new custodian to quickly react to market conditions. # Motivation Block production is an essential component of the BitShares platform itself, and as such should be expected to take an agnostic and neutral view towards the products deployed within the platform. Therefore, this BSIP will define a process for BitAsset management to ensure protocol security remains the singular focus of the block producer role and give BitAssets the best chance for long-term stability by nominating a new custodian to quickly react to market conditions. In order for the distributed consensus mechanism of DPOS to achieve adequate decentralization, it is imperative that block producers maintain strict independence from the politics of individual products deployed on the platform. -Governance is an important component of the core BTS token and effective application of governance throughout the BitShares protocol is imperative to the long-term success of the project. A number of BSIPs have addressed the shortcomings of the existing vote calculation mechanism. This BSIP changes vote calculation which currently confers governance rights which are intended for assignment to the protocol. - -In short, this BSIP will put the BitAssets under the control of a designated user account. With this change, the newly appointed BitAssets manager will be able to independently maintain the parameters of their derivative asset without interference from the platform’s block producers and committee members. At the same time, the platform itself and its committee will not be unduly influenced by the demands of private product management. An advantage gained by this is that the BitAsset manager will be able to react appropriately to rapidly changing market conditions, as may be required to properly maintain a successful derivative asset. +In short, this BSIP will put the BitAssets under the control of a new user account controlled by the stakeholders through a new type of voting. With this change, the newly appointed BitAssets manager will be able to independently maintain the parameters of their derivative asset without interference from the platform’s block producers and committee members. At the same time, the platform itself and its committee will not be unduly influenced by the demands of private product management. An advantage gained by this is that the BitAsset manager will be able to react appropriately to rapidly changing market conditions, as may be required to properly maintain a successful derivative asset. # Rationale -Because the BitAssets are currently controlled by platform-wide governance mechanisms, and because these are not well suited to the management of smart coins, which may at times need to respond quickly to market conditions, the authors propose to reorganize these assets to utilize a directly appointed multisignature authority and thereby enable these assets to update in synchronization with market ebbs and flows. - -The authors recommend reassigning the blockchain-controlled BitAssets’ issuer field from committee-account to cn-vote, which is a multisignature account composed of seven different parties and having numerous proxy followers, and setting cn-vote as the sole feed producer, until cn-vote can delegate this role to accounts of its own appointment. The authors selected cn-vote for this role because cn-vote has demonstrated an active and vested interest in the stability and viability of the BitAsset products. Should cn-vote accept this appointment, the specification of the BitAsset parameters and feed production will become the responsibility of the cn-vote multisignature account. +Because the BitAssets are currently controlled by platform-wide governance mechanisms, and because these are not well suited to the management of smart coins, which may at times need to respond quickly to market conditions, the authors propose to reorganize these assets to utilize a dedicated stakeholder-voted multisignature authority and thereby enable these assets to update in synchronization with market ebbs and flows. -As a result of this assignment, the block producers will no longer provide feeds for BitAssets, and the new set of feed producers will no longer be affected by direct stakeholder voting. - -Because BitAsset management will no longer be affected by stakeholder voting, the vote-weighting calculations can be amended without detriment so that accounts holding BTS collateral positions will count only collateral above the value of their debt at the feed price. Collateral up to a 1.0 collateral-to-debt ratio is under lien to the BitAsset holder, and therefore does not represent a stake in the blockchain, and will no longer be counted as voting stake. Collateral in excess of a 1.0 collateral-to-debt ratio will continue to be counted in the debt holder’s voting stake. +The block producers will no longer provide feeds for BitAssets. # Specification -The blockchain software is designed to support assets with multisignature issuer authorities; therefore, the technical changes required for this proposal are straightforward. The following technical changes are required: +The following technical changes are required: **Assignment of Accumulated Fees** At the hardfork date, the accumulated fees of the existing BitAssets will be transferred to the committee-account. -**Update to Committee-Controlled BitAsset Issuer Fields** +**Creation of BITASSET.MANAGER asset** -At the hardfork date, the committee-controlled BitAsset objects' issuer fields will be updated to specify the cn-vote account (ID 1.2.1148184). The existing price feeds will be cleared, and the cn-vote account will be specified as the feed producer. After the hardfork, the cn-vote account will be able to assign other feed producers at its discretion. +At the hardfork date, a new BITASSET.MANAGER asset will be created with the committee account as its owner and all flags and permissions disabled. The initial distribution will be made equal to the current BTS distribution. BTS that are locked up in open orders, in collateral positions, in HTLC objects or in vesting balances will be assigned to the owners of the respective positions. Other BTS positions are out of scope (e. g. stealth). +Subsequently, tokens of this new asset can be freely transferred or traded. -**Disable the witness_fed_asset and committee_fed_asset Flags** +**Add a feeding_authority extension to BitAssets** + +An extension will be added to `asset_update_bitasset_operation` that allows specifying an elected authority (see BSIP-0084) for determining the list of feed producers. `asset_publish_feed_operation` will be adapted to check that authority if the extension is present on a BitAsset. + +**Addition of voting process through BITASSET.MANAGER** -At the hardfork date, the `witness_fed_asset` and `committee_fed_asset` flags will be unset from the BitAssets, and will be disabled from use in future assets. +Two new elected authorities (see BSIP-0084) will be created based on the BITASSET.MANAGER asset with settings that match the current voting mechanism (regarding min/max_number and proxy_allowed). The first one is for controlling the new bitasset-manager account (see below), the second one for selecting price feeders. -**Amend total_core_in_orders to Track Limit and Collateral Orders Separately** +**Update to Committee-Controlled BitAsset Issuer Fields** + +At the hardfork date, a new bitasset-manager account will be created with its active authority set to the first of the new elected authorities, and with the owner authority controlled by the committee. +The committee-controlled BitAsset objects' issuer fields will be updated to specify this new account. +After the hardfork, the new account will be able to assign other feed producers at its discretion. + +**Disable the witness_fed_asset and committee_fed_asset Flags** -The `total_core_in_orders` field of the `account_statistics_object` will be deprecated, and assets in limit orders will be tallied in a new `total_core_in_limit_orders` field while collateral will be tracked in a new `total_core_in_collateral_orders` map, keyed on the collateralized asset ID. During vote weight calculation, the `total_core_in_limit_orders` will add directly to the account’s voting weight; additionally, the `total_core_in_collateral_orders` which exceeds the feed price value of the collateralized debt will be added to the account’s voting weight as well. +At the hardfork date, the `witness_fed_asset` and `committee_fed_asset` flags will be unset from the committee-owned BitAssets, and will be disabled from use in future assets. The existing price feeds will be cleared. The BitAssets will have the feeding_authority extension set to the second of the new elected authorities. **Enable Remittance of Worker Proposals in Core Asset** Escrow agents administering existing worker proposals presently denominated in BitAssets shall be authorized to remit worker payments in BitShares core asset, or in a BitAsset selected at the discretion of the workers and escrow agents. # Discussion -### Voting Power -The voting power of debt holders will be reduced to only the portion of collateral that exceeds full collateral valuation of the debt assets that are borrowed from the blockchain. It is arguable who “owns” BTS that are locked up as collateral in BitAsset smart contracts. The authors of this BSIP hold the view that debt holders have received BitAssets in return for their collateral (which they may have sold on the market for more BTS), and thus have given up rights to the collateral itself, at least to the portion of collateral that represents the value of the BitAssets they have received. It is only logical that by exchanging the collateral for BitAssets they have given up the rights associated with the collateral, including its voting power. + ### Worker Proposals + Worker proposals were originally denominated in BitAssets with the intent to add liquidity in their respective markets. With BitAssets now being placed under user control, liquidity is no longer the concern of the platform. A further implication of placing BitAssets under custodian control is that workers being paid in BitAssets would be exposed to the risk of devaluation and/or de-pegging at the custodian's discretion. This BSIP aims to remedy this by allowing different payout methods deemed less risky. # Summary -In this BSIP the authors provide a unified solution to advance the project forward most efficiently. This proposal will decouple BitAssets from the rest of the BitShares platform with regard to governance. Instead, BitAssets can be controlled independently by a new BitAsset manager. The platform will be governed by the elected witnesses and committee, as before. This BSIP does not impact non-BitAsset Smart Coins. + +In this BSIP the authors provide a unified solution to advance the project forward most efficiently. This proposal will decouple BitAssets from the rest of the BitShares platform with regard to governance. Instead, BitAssets can be controlled independently by a new BitAsset manager elected by interested parties. The platform will be governed by the elected witnesses and committee, as before. This BSIP does not impact non-BitAsset Smart Coins. # Copyright This document is placed into the public domain. From e02d4d8136ebb82a02ba46365b4d6916e9505979 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Conrad Date: Sat, 19 Oct 2019 18:51:10 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 3/5] Clarifications, changes for smoother transition --- bsip-0083.md | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/bsip-0083.md b/bsip-0083.md index 51fb6c5..7fc34a0 100644 --- a/bsip-0083.md +++ b/bsip-0083.md @@ -25,12 +25,14 @@ Therefore, this BSIP defines a process for BitAssets management to ensure protoc # Motivation Block production is an essential component of the BitShares platform itself, and as such should be expected to take an agnostic and neutral view towards the products deployed within the platform. Therefore, this BSIP will define a process for BitAsset management to ensure protocol security remains the singular focus of the block producer role and give BitAssets the best chance for long-term stability by nominating a new custodian to quickly react to market conditions. In order for the distributed consensus mechanism of DPOS to achieve adequate decentralization, it is imperative that block producers maintain strict independence from the politics of individual products deployed on the platform. -In short, this BSIP will put the BitAssets under the control of a new user account controlled by the stakeholders through a new type of voting. With this change, the newly appointed BitAssets manager will be able to independently maintain the parameters of their derivative asset without interference from the platform’s block producers and committee members. At the same time, the platform itself and its committee will not be unduly influenced by the demands of private product management. An advantage gained by this is that the BitAsset manager will be able to react appropriately to rapidly changing market conditions, as may be required to properly maintain a successful derivative asset. +In short, this BSIP will put the BitAssets under the control of a new user account controlled by the stakeholders through a new type of voting. With this change, the newly appointed BitAssets manager will be able to independently maintain the parameters of their derivative asset without interference from the platform’s block producers and committee members. At the same time, the platform itself and its committee will not be unduly influenced by the demands of product management. An advantage gained by this is that the BitAsset manager will be able to react appropriately to rapidly changing market conditions, as may be required to properly maintain a successful derivative asset. # Rationale Because the BitAssets are currently controlled by platform-wide governance mechanisms, and because these are not well suited to the management of smart coins, which may at times need to respond quickly to market conditions, the authors propose to reorganize these assets to utilize a dedicated stakeholder-voted multisignature authority and thereby enable these assets to update in synchronization with market ebbs and flows. -The block producers will no longer provide feeds for BitAssets. +The block producers will no longer provide feeds for BitAssets. Instead another set of accounts will be authorized to provide feeds for BitAssets. These accounts will be elected through stake-weighted voting with a new voting token called BITASSET.MANAGEMENT. The initial distribution of this new voting token will be made equal to the current BTS distribution. Subsequently, tokens of this new asset can be freely transferred or traded. + +Stake-weighted voting will also be used to elect a BitAsset Manager account (bitasset-manager) who will have the authority to change the settings of any BitAsset that are currently changeable by the Committee through proposals. The Committee will retain full control over the manager account, but is expected to leave day-to-day operations to the new elected entity. # Specification The following technical changes are required: @@ -39,28 +41,32 @@ The following technical changes are required: At the hardfork date, the accumulated fees of the existing BitAssets will be transferred to the committee-account. -**Creation of BITASSET.MANAGER asset** +**Creation of BITASSET.MANAGEMENT asset** -At the hardfork date, a new BITASSET.MANAGER asset will be created with the committee account as its owner and all flags and permissions disabled. The initial distribution will be made equal to the current BTS distribution. BTS that are locked up in open orders, in collateral positions, in HTLC objects or in vesting balances will be assigned to the owners of the respective positions. Other BTS positions are out of scope (e. g. stealth). +At the hardfork date, a new BITASSET.MANAGEMENT asset will be created with the committee account as its owner and all flags and permissions disabled. The initial distribution will be made equal to the current BTS distribution. BTS that are locked up in open orders, in collateral positions, in HTLC objects or in vesting balances will be assigned to the owners of the respective positions. Other BTS positions are out of scope (e. g. stealth). Subsequently, tokens of this new asset can be freely transferred or traded. **Add a feeding_authority extension to BitAssets** An extension will be added to `asset_update_bitasset_operation` that allows specifying an elected authority (see BSIP-0084) for determining the list of feed producers. `asset_publish_feed_operation` will be adapted to check that authority if the extension is present on a BitAsset. -**Addition of voting process through BITASSET.MANAGER** +**Addition of voting process through BITASSET.MANAGEMENT** -Two new elected authorities (see BSIP-0084) will be created based on the BITASSET.MANAGER asset with settings that match the current voting mechanism (regarding min/max_number and proxy_allowed). The first one is for controlling the new bitasset-manager account (see below), the second one for selecting price feeders. +Two new elected authorities (see BSIP-0084) will be created based on the BITASSET.MANAGEMENT asset with settings that match the current voting mechanism (regarding min/max_number and proxy_allowed). The first one is for controlling the new bitasset-manager account (see below), the second one for selecting price feeders. **Update to Committee-Controlled BitAsset Issuer Fields** -At the hardfork date, a new bitasset-manager account will be created with its active authority set to the first of the new elected authorities, and with the owner authority controlled by the committee. +At the hardfork date, a new bitasset-manager account will be created with its owner and active authorities controlled by the committee. The committee-controlled BitAsset objects' issuer fields will be updated to specify this new account. After the hardfork, the new account will be able to assign other feed producers at its discretion. **Disable the witness_fed_asset and committee_fed_asset Flags** -At the hardfork date, the `witness_fed_asset` and `committee_fed_asset` flags will be unset from the committee-owned BitAssets, and will be disabled from use in future assets. The existing price feeds will be cleared. The BitAssets will have the feeding_authority extension set to the second of the new elected authorities. +At the hardfork date, the `witness_fed_asset` and `committee_fed_asset` flags will be unset from all BitAssets, and will be disabled from use in future assets. Afterwards, the witnesses will still be able to provide a pricefeed, but the list of price feeders is no longer tied to the witness role. Instead, the list will have to be managed manually by the asset issuer, until the new feeding_authority is defined. This ensures a smooth transition without interrupting operations. + +**Activate elected authorities** + +By approving this BSIP, the shareholders instruct the committee to set the active authority of the bitasset manager account to the entity elected to act as the bitasset-manager account, and to set the feeding_authority extension of all BitAssets controlled by the bitasset-manager account to the entity elected for the curation of the price feed list, after sufficient shareholders have voted on the new entities, but no later than two weeks after the hardfork date. **Enable Remittance of Worker Proposals in Core Asset** @@ -68,10 +74,16 @@ Escrow agents administering existing worker proposals presently denominated in B # Discussion -### Worker Proposals +## Worker Proposals Worker proposals were originally denominated in BitAssets with the intent to add liquidity in their respective markets. With BitAssets now being placed under user control, liquidity is no longer the concern of the platform. A further implication of placing BitAssets under custodian control is that workers being paid in BitAssets would be exposed to the risk of devaluation and/or de-pegging at the custodian's discretion. This BSIP aims to remedy this by allowing different payout methods deemed less risky. +## Comparison with Recent Committee Proposal + +The BitShares Committee has recently [assumed the selection of price feeders for some BitAssets](https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=29702.0). This change shifts the selection of feed price providers from direct voting by BTS holders for block producers, who also provide feed prices, to indirect voting by BTS holders for Committee members. This is an applaudable first step. + +This BSIP goes further in that it decouples not only the selection for block producers from feed price providers, it also decouples the BitAsset ownership and management from the current committee. BTS holders will still be able to vote directly for Committee members and block producers. In addition, current BTS holders will be able to vote directly for feed price providers using their new BITASSET.MANAGEMENT tokens. + # Summary In this BSIP the authors provide a unified solution to advance the project forward most efficiently. This proposal will decouple BitAssets from the rest of the BitShares platform with regard to governance. Instead, BitAssets can be controlled independently by a new BitAsset manager elected by interested parties. The platform will be governed by the elected witnesses and committee, as before. This BSIP does not impact non-BitAsset Smart Coins. From d0db1a074925cc0d17b841cd1b9b59d96a6cba97 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: John Jones Date: Fri, 25 Oct 2019 09:27:51 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 4/5] worker proposal changes --- bsip-0083.md | 12 +++++------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/bsip-0083.md b/bsip-0083.md index 7fc34a0..ffd5fd4 100644 --- a/bsip-0083.md +++ b/bsip-0083.md @@ -48,11 +48,11 @@ Subsequently, tokens of this new asset can be freely transferred or traded. **Add a feeding_authority extension to BitAssets** -An extension will be added to `asset_update_bitasset_operation` that allows specifying an elected authority (see BSIP-0084) for determining the list of feed producers. `asset_publish_feed_operation` will be adapted to check that authority if the extension is present on a BitAsset. +An extension will be added to `asset_update_bitasset_operation` that allows specifying an elected authority ([see BSIP-0084](bsip-0084.md)) for determining the list of feed producers. `asset_publish_feed_operation` will be adapted to check that authority if the extension is present on a BitAsset. **Addition of voting process through BITASSET.MANAGEMENT** -Two new elected authorities (see BSIP-0084) will be created based on the BITASSET.MANAGEMENT asset with settings that match the current voting mechanism (regarding min/max_number and proxy_allowed). The first one is for controlling the new bitasset-manager account (see below), the second one for selecting price feeders. +Two new elected authorities ([see BSIP-0084](bsip-0084.md)) will be created based on the BITASSET.MANAGEMENT asset with settings that match the current voting mechanism (regarding min/max_number and proxy_allowed). The first one is for controlling the new bitasset-manager account (see below), the second one for selecting price feeders. **Update to Committee-Controlled BitAsset Issuer Fields** @@ -68,15 +68,13 @@ At the hardfork date, the `witness_fed_asset` and `committee_fed_asset` flags wi By approving this BSIP, the shareholders instruct the committee to set the active authority of the bitasset manager account to the entity elected to act as the bitasset-manager account, and to set the feeding_authority extension of all BitAssets controlled by the bitasset-manager account to the entity elected for the curation of the price feed list, after sufficient shareholders have voted on the new entities, but no later than two weeks after the hardfork date. -**Enable Remittance of Worker Proposals in Core Asset** - -Escrow agents administering existing worker proposals presently denominated in BitAssets shall be authorized to remit worker payments in BitShares core asset, or in a BitAsset selected at the discretion of the workers and escrow agents. - # Discussion ## Worker Proposals -Worker proposals were originally denominated in BitAssets with the intent to add liquidity in their respective markets. With BitAssets now being placed under user control, liquidity is no longer the concern of the platform. A further implication of placing BitAssets under custodian control is that workers being paid in BitAssets would be exposed to the risk of devaluation and/or de-pegging at the custodian's discretion. This BSIP aims to remedy this by allowing different payout methods deemed less risky. +Worker proposals were originally denominated in BitAssets with the intent to add liquidity in their respective markets, and advance them as a favored platform product. With BitAssets now being placed under the control of an independent manager, liquidity of a single particular product line is no longer the concern of the platform. A further implication of placing BitAssets under custodian control is that workers being paid in BitAssets would be exposed to the risk of devaluation and/or de-pegging at the custodian's discretion. Since this BSIP separates the BitAsset products from the platform, it may also sunset the tradition of preferentially denominating worker proposals in BitAssets, and free worker proposal authors to choose from a wider range of payout options, whether BitAsset or otherwise. + + The authors of this BSIP recommend that worker proposals be open in selecting payout methods. ## Comparison with Recent Committee Proposal From b80ac84161e24c0b14d1cb6e32d4a9e1221e8f32 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: John Jones Date: Fri, 25 Oct 2019 09:29:04 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 5/5] Remove leftover sentence --- bsip-0083.md | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/bsip-0083.md b/bsip-0083.md index ffd5fd4..abaa835 100644 --- a/bsip-0083.md +++ b/bsip-0083.md @@ -74,8 +74,6 @@ By approving this BSIP, the shareholders instruct the committee to set the activ Worker proposals were originally denominated in BitAssets with the intent to add liquidity in their respective markets, and advance them as a favored platform product. With BitAssets now being placed under the control of an independent manager, liquidity of a single particular product line is no longer the concern of the platform. A further implication of placing BitAssets under custodian control is that workers being paid in BitAssets would be exposed to the risk of devaluation and/or de-pegging at the custodian's discretion. Since this BSIP separates the BitAsset products from the platform, it may also sunset the tradition of preferentially denominating worker proposals in BitAssets, and free worker proposal authors to choose from a wider range of payout options, whether BitAsset or otherwise. - The authors of this BSIP recommend that worker proposals be open in selecting payout methods. - ## Comparison with Recent Committee Proposal The BitShares Committee has recently [assumed the selection of price feeders for some BitAssets](https://bitsharestalk.org/index.php?topic=29702.0). This change shifts the selection of feed price providers from direct voting by BTS holders for block producers, who also provide feed prices, to indirect voting by BTS holders for Committee members. This is an applaudable first step.