RVD#3346: Data Distribution Service (DDS) Chain of Trust (CoT) violation in Cyclone DDS

[vmayoral]

{
    "id": 3346,
    "title": "RVD#3346: Data Distribution Service (DDS) Chain of Trust (CoT) violation in Cyclone DDS",
    "type": "vulnerability",
    "description": "Attacker can arbitrarily craft malicious DDS Participants (or ROS 2 Nodes) with valid certificates to compromise and get full control of the attacked secure DDS databus system by exploiting vulnerable attributes in the configuration of PKCS#7 certificate’s validation. This is caused by a non-compliant implementation of permission document verification used by some DDS vendors. Specifically, an improper use of the OpenSSL PKCS7_verify function used to validate S/MIME signatures.",
    "cwe": "CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor)",
    "cve": "CVE-2023-24011",
    "keywords": [
        "Robot Operating System 2",
        "ROS 2",
        "Data Distribution Service",
        "DDS",
        "Cyclone DDS"
    ],
    "system": "DDS",
    "vendor": "ZettaScale",
    "severity": {
        "rvss-score": 8.2,
        "rvss-vector": "RVSS:1.0/AV:RN/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/Y:Z/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L/H:U",
        "severity-description": "high",
        "cvss-score": 8.2,
        "cvss-vector": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L"
    },
    "links": [
        "https://github.com/ros2/sros2/issues/282",
        "https://gist.github.com/vmayoral/235c02d0b0ef85a29812eff6980ff80d",
    ],
    "flaw": {
        "phase": "runtime-operation",
        "specificity": "DDS implementation-specific",
        "architectural-location": "platform code",
        "application": "any DDS Participant or ROS 2 node communicating",
        "subsystem": "cognition:middleware",
        "package": "sros2",
        "languages": "C++",
        "date-detected": "2022-12-13",
        "detected-by": "amrc-benmorrow, Gianluca Caizza, Ruffin White, Victor Mayoral Vilches, Mikael Arguedas",
        "detected-by-method": "runtime detection",
        "date-reported": "2023-02-25",
        "reported-by": "Victor Mayoral Vilches",
        "reported-by-relationship": "security researcher",
        "issue": "https://github.com/aliasrobotics/RVD/issues/3346",
        "reproducibility": "always",
        "trace": "N/A",
        "reproduction": "https://gist.github.com/vmayoral/235c02d0b0ef85a29812eff6980ff80d",
        "reproduction-image": "Not available"
    },
    "exploitation": {
        "description": "A simple PoC is discussed at https://github.com/ros2/sros2/issues/282 and available at https://gist.github.com/vmayoral/235c02d0b0ef85a29812eff6980ff80d.",
        "exploitation-image": "Not available",
        "exploitation-vector": "Not available"
    },
    "mitigation": {
        "description": "1) Instead of including the Permission CA into the store of trusted certificates to use for chain verification, the Permission CA (and only the Permission CA) should be included in the set of certificates in which to search for signer's certificates. The store of trusted certificates to use for chain verification should then also be set to null. 2) With the store of trusted certificates to use for chain verification set to null, the PKCS7_NOVERIFY flag should then be enabled so any signer's certificates (i.e. only the Permission CA) is not chain verified. 3) Given that only a valid signer's certificate must be the Permission CA, the PKCS7_NOINTERN flag should then be enabled so any set of certificates in the message itself are not searched when locating the signer's certificates. More details available at discussion at https://github.com/ros2/sros2/issues/282. ",
        "pull-request": "https://github.com/ros2/sros2/issues/282 (issue, not PR)",
        "date-mitigation": ""
    }
}