Is there a secure enclave that can remotely attest integrity to a third party?

[troublesprouter]

Sorry to ask here since it's not really about the repo itself, but I thought it might be best to ask publicly and to everyone at once:

Is there a secure enclave that can remotely attest integrity to a third party (via direct verification of a signature with things like ECDSA, not calling eg an Intel API)?

Assuming the person running the enclave has root access to the host system and is adversarial, is SGX or another hardware enclave capable of attesting to a third party that the code being run is in fact the one previously agreed upon, and that even an adversarial user with root access has no access to the private key that signs the attestation and other things within the enclave?

If it is possible, is it possible with SGX? (I understand it's not from your and previous findings?)

Is it possible on other "secure" hardware?

Much appreciated. I'm working on a product, not research, but it requires the above for it to work.